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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF AN
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
IN NEW YORK STATE
INTRODUaMON
The warranty of habitability in residential landlord-tenant leases
can no longer be considered a legal oddity. The doctrine has not
only received extensive treatment in professional journals, but, as of
this writing, at least fifteen jurisdictions have adopted it.' However,
the status of the warranty in New York State is still unclear, for,
while the Civil Court of the City of New York has been utilizing the
doctrine since 1971,2 the appellate courts of the state have not defin-
atively ruled on the issue. In light of the unresolved nature of the
present situation, this Comment will investigate and assess five aspects
of the warranty's impact on the laws and housing stock of the State
of New York. First, those lower court warranty cases which already
exist in the state will be examined in order to assess the nature of the
doctrine's development to the present. Second, an analysis of the
warranty doctrine as it affects existing New York landlord-tenant
statutes will be undertaken. Third, the economic impact of the war-
ranty doctrine upon rental housing markets will be assessed in order
to determine if the doctrine will yield adverse or favorable results in
terms of the quality and quantity of present housing stocks. Fourth,
the effectiveness of a change within the law, such as the adoption of
the warranty, will be compared to other possible approaches for re-
forming the landlord-tenant law. Finally, an assessment of the impact
of the doctrine and an analysis of the possible position New York
courts may adopt if and when they are called upon to rule on the
scope of the warranty's effect, will be made.
1. Special Project, Developments in Contemporary Landlord-Tenant Law, 26
VAND. L. Rnv. 689, 729-39 (1973). It should be noted that the courts of five jurisdic-
tions have recently rejected the warranty of habitability. Id. at 730-31.
2. E.g., Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 325, 323
N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971); Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15,
318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971).
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WARRANTY BACKGROUND
The ancient property concepts which generally govern the land-
lord-tenant relationship even today originated in medieval England.
Over the centuries a number of legal tenets developed which, when
assessed in light of modern realities, have proven to be inappropriate
for the contemporary urban dweller.3 For example, under the caveat
emptor rule, the tenant accepted the premises "as is," having no re-
dress against the landlord for defects of quality unless he was legally
defrauded 4 However, this rule has left the modern tenant unprotected
for, prior to renting a unit, he cannot reasonably be expected to per-
form an intelligent investigation of an architecturally and technically
sophisticated contemporary apartment building. Another legal tenet
which developed from ancient estate principles was the "no-repair"
rule. This rule developed due to the passive role that a landlord as-
sumed once his interest was conveyed. It provided that a landlord
could not lawfully enter the premises without the tenant's consent.
Thus, tenants undertook the responsibilities of repairing and main-
taining the premises. Again, these responsibilities present an impos-
sible task for the contemporary urban tenant who is faced with the
complexities of a modern unit.6
In response to the needs of urban tenants, it became customary,
probably as a result of market pressures, to include basic repair and
service obligations (for example, the supplying of heat and water)
in the lease as duties of the landlord.7 However, the tenant's remedies
for a breach of such covenants proved to be inadequate because the
courts continued to view the lease as a conveyance. This interpretation
demanded that the tenant continue to pay rent in order to enforce
the promises made by the landlord with regard to services and repairs
or be faced with eviction." The only remedy available was a suit for
3. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant, 38
FORDHAm L. REV. 225, 227-31 (1970).
4. MODEL RESMNTIAL LANDLoRD-TENANT CODE General Introduction, at 5
(Tent. Draft 1969).
5. Comment, Tenant Protection in Iowa, 58 IoWA L. REv. 656, 659-61 (1973).
6. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077-79 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE General Introduction, at 6 (Tent. Draft
1969); Comment, The Landlord's Common-Law Duty to Repair, 22 SYRACusE L. Rv.
997, 998-99 (1971).
7. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 3, at 232.
8. Comment, supra note 6, at 999-1000.
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damages on the ground of breach of the lease. Besides being costly and
time consuming, this remedy put little pressure on the landlord to
fulfill his duties since the rent was still being paid. As a result, the
tenant had to suffer the uncomfortable consequences of living in prem-
ises which were without essential services. 9
Recognizing the impracticalities of this remedy, various jurisdic-
tions developed other legal devices, including the doctrine of con-
structive eviction,10 housing codes," and remedial statutes. 2 However,
all these attempts have been unavailing.'3 It is readily conceded by
commentators 14 and judges5 alike that contemporary landlord-tenant
law is generally ineffective in providing tenants with adequate legal
devices to enforce their rights. In response to the plight of the urban
tenant in particular and to the inadequacies of the landlord-tenant
law in general, many commentators have advocated the implementa-
tion of an implied warranty of habitability; 16 and the courts of ap-
9. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 3, at 234.
10. Id. at 235-37. In recent years, constructive eviction without abandonment has
been suggested, but this modification has met with little success. See Barash v. Pennsyl-
vania Terminal Real Estate Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 77, 256 N.E.2d 707, 308 N.Y.S.2d 649
(1970), revg 31 App. Div. 2d 342, 298 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1969); McCarthy & Wolf,
Real Property, 1970-71 ANNUAL SURVEY oir Ar. L. 365, 374-75.
11. As of 1968, over 4,900 municipalities had housing codes and many states had
set minimum standards. Comment, Judicial Expansion of Tenant's Private Law Rights,
56 CORNELL L. RaV. 489, 491 (1971); see, e.g., N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW §§ 1-365
(McKinney Supp. 1973); D.C. CODE ENCYOL. AWN. §§ 5-501 to 634 (West 1966), as
amended, (West Supp. 1970); WASHINGTON, D.C., HOUSING REGULATIONS §§ 2304,
2501 (1956).
12. E.g., N.Y. REAL PRoP. ACTIONS LAW §§ 769-82 (McKinney Supp. 1973);
id. § 755. See also Special Project, supra note 1, at 740-41.
13. For material on the failure of the doctrine of constructive eviction to provide
an adequate remedy for tenants, see note 10 supra. For a discussion of the inadequacies
of housing codes, see Quinn & Phillips, supra note 3, at 239-41; Comment, supra note
6, at 1002-03. Material on the ineffectiveness of New York's remedial statutes is found
in Quinn & Phillips, supra note 3, at 242-49.
14. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 3, at 225.
15. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
16. E.g., Quinn & Phillips, supra note 3, at 254; Schoshinski, Remedies of the
Indigent Tenant, 54 GEo. L.J. 519, 523-28 (1966); Skillern, Implied Warranty in
Leases, 44 DEN. L.J. 387 (1967). Warranties have been employed in many areas of
the law, notably in the sales field. See Jaeger, The Warranty of Habitability (pt. 1),
46 CHI-KENT L. REv. 123 (1969); Jaeger, The Warranty of Habitability (pt. 2), 47
CHI-KENT L. REv. 1, 1-27 (1970). However, in real property, warranties have been
utilized in very few instances and only under limited circumstances. Skillern, supra, at
391-93. Judicial recognition of an implied warranty of habitability first occurred in
short term furnished rentals. E.g., Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922);
Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). In recent years, there has also
been some movement toward implying a warranty of habitability into the sale of new
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proximately fifteen jurisdictions have reacted by adopting the war-
ranty doctrine.17
While the court decisions adopting a warranty vary with respect
to detail, there are a number of concepts which are common to all and
are essential to an understanding of the doctrine. The warranty of
habitability is often expressed in terms of warranting the fitness of the
housing unit for a particular purpose.'8 The modem tenant expects
not only a shelter, but also a "package of goods and services" which
includes "adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing
facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation and proper
maintenance."' 19 To secure these goods and services, the tenant agrees
to pay rent.20 Thus, according to this view, the transaction is essentially
a contractual one wherein a promise to pay rent is exchanged for a
promise to provide a habitable dwelling.21 The legal ramifications of
such an analysis are rather astounding. By characterizing the landlord-
tenant relationship as contractual,2 2 the courts take the view that a
tenant, as a buyer, relies on the expertise of the landlord, as a sup-
plier, to meet the tenant's legitimate expectations in light of the ren-
tal unit's intended use.2 3 Once an implied warranty of habitability is
judicially read into the lease, the obligation on the part of the tenant
to pay rent is dependent upon the landlord's performance of his
obligation to provide a habitable dwelling.24 Of course, this result
contradicts the property law concept that a tenant, who has failed to
pay his rent, can be evicted for nonpayment even though the landlord
has breached a provision in the lease by failing to provide services.2 1
Under the contract theory, even if the court determines that a land-
lord's breach of the warranty was such that the tenant is only entitled
homes. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Jaeger, The
Warranty of Habitability, 47 CHI-KENT L. REv. 1, 30-52 (1970); Skillern, supra, at
393; Note, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 626 (1971).
17. Special Project, supra note 1, at 729-30. There are also at least twenty juris-
dictions with remedial statutes which alter the tenant's obligation to pay rent when a
landlord fails to maintain his premises in a habitable condition. Id. at 740-41. One
new addition to this type of statute is MINN. STAT. § 504.18 (Supp. 1973).
18. Skillern, supra note 16, at 394. Cf. UNIFORM COMAUERCAL CODE § 2-315.
19. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
20. Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 999, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406, 410
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973).
21. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 436, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (1969).
22. See notes 7-9 supra & accompanying text.
23. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075-76 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
24. Id. at 1082.
25. See note 8 supra & accompanying text.
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to a partial setoff from his rent, the tenant can pay the landlord that
portion which is due and defeat an action by the landlord for posses-
sion on the ground of nonpayment 2 6 The warranty also allows the
tenant access to all the traditional contract remedies, including dam-
ages, reformation, rescission,2 7 and specific performance.28 Further-
more, the tenant may be allowed the right to repair the premises and
deduct the cost from his rent.
29
THE WARRANTY IN NEW YORK STATE
Prior to 1971, New York rejected the implied warranty of habit-
ability doctrine.80 That year, in Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown,31 three
tenants were permitted to defend against the landlord's nonpayment
summary proceeding on the warranty ground. Relying on contract
principles, the court emphasized the tenants' lack of bargaining power
as a basis for rejecting the caveat emptor rule, and read the housing
code requirements into residential leases as the minimum standards of
habitability.8 2 Thus, the court laid the foundation for acceptance of
the warranty doctrine in New York. While Amanuensis has resulted in
a line of cases ruling in favor of the adoption of the doctrine, 3 it must
be stressed that all of these subsequent cases, and Amanuensis itself,
were decisions of the Civil Court of the City of New York and do not
possess any force of precedent outside the Civil Court.34 Therefore, it
26. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
27. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 436, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (1969).
28. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.61 (D.C. Cir.
1970). But cf. Samson Management Corp. v. Reichman, 63 Misc. 2d 238, 309 N.Y.S.
2d 838, 842 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Abrams v. S.A. Schwartz Co., 7 Misc. 2d 635, 161
N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1016 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (in which it was held that in New York, a
tenant cannot obtain an order to force a landlord to make capital improvements).
29. See Jackson v. Rivera, 65 Misc. 2d 468, 318 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
1971).
30. Potter v. New York, 0. & W. Ry., 233 App. Div. 578, 253 N.Y.S. 394 (4th
Dep't. 1931), aff'd, 261 N.Y. 489, 185 N.E. 708, 264 N.Y.S. 489 (1933); Looney v.
Smith, 198 Misc. 99, 96 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Byrnheim-Linden Realty Corp.
v. Great E. Contracting Co., 41 Misc. 2d 361, 245 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Nassau County Ct.
1963).
31. 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971).
32. Id. at 19-21, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 17-19.
33. E.g., Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 325, 323
N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971).
34. See Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 1000, 343 N.Y.S.2d
406, 411 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973). See also Special Project, supra note 1, at 729-31,
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cannot be said that the warranty has definitely become part of the
common law of New York. However, by virtue of these decisions, and
the general trend which is in evidence throughout the country, the
state of legal limbo in which the warranty exists cannot continue in-
definitely.
Despite the lack of appellate authority for the warranty doctrine
in New York, the lower court cases present an interesting, even pe-
culiar, example of the development of a common law doctrine. Because
Amanuensis was the first case to sustain the warranty in New York, the
court found it necessary to restrict that case to its facts in order to cir-
cumvent precedents which had excluded the warranty.85 As a result
of this distinguishing process,86 three preconditions to the assertion
of a defense based on the warranty were established. 7 Although sub-
sequent case law did not adhere to the last two of the Amanuensis
prerequisites, 38 the first criterion, which required the tenant to show
that the landlord made "no good faith effort to comply with the
[housing codes]," remained a major obstacle to the full employment
which lists most of the warranty of habitability cases along with those jurisdictions
which have adopted the doctrine. Note that as of 1973 every jurisdiction except
Colorado, Ohio and New York has developed appellate authority for the doctrine.
An indication that the warranty cases are not as yet being followed throughout
the state is found in the ruling of one appellate court outside the City of New York
which expressly ruled against the acceptance of the warranty. The court reversed a
lower court which had issued a preliminary injunction ordering a landlord to repair
a number of housing code violations, Graham v. Wisenburn, 39 App. Div. 2d 334, 334
N.Y.S.2d 81 (3d Dep't. 1972), re'g 70 Misc. 2d 492, 334 N.Y.S.2d 79 (Sup. Ct.).
Interestingly, neither the lower court's decision in Graham nor the subsequent appellate
court reversal mentioned any of the New York City warranty of habitability cases, in-
dicating either a "hands-off" attitude, or an unawareness of their existence.
35. See 65 Misc. 2d at 18-21, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 15-18.
36. For an interesting jurisprudential discussion on the use of the distinguishing
process for the purpose of circumventing' stare decisis, see J. FRANK, COURTS ON TIAL
275-77 (1970).
37. The three preconditions which must be established by the evidence before the
warranty doctrine can be employed were set forth in Amanuensis:
First, where the landlord has not made a good faith effort to comply with
the law, and there have been substantial [housing code] violations seriously
affecting the habitability of the premises.
Second, where there are substantial violations and codes enforcement
remedies have been pursued and have been ineffective.
Third, where substantial viglations exist and their continuance is part of
a purposeful and illegal effort to force tenants to abandon their apartments.
64 Misc. 2d at 21, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
38. See Mannie Joseph, Inc. v. Stewart, 71 Misc. 2d 160, 335 N.Y.S.2d 709
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1972); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 325, 323
N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971); Jackson v. Rivera, 65 Misc. 2d 468, 318 N.Y.S.
2d 7 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971).
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of the warranty doctrine in New York State. Clearly, the evidentiary
burden imposed on the tenant in proving that his landlord did not
make a good faith effort to repair is a higher standard of proof than
that employed in other jurisdictions utilizing the warranty doctrine.3
Indeed, for the tenant to prove that the landlord's efforts were not in
good faith, there must be evidence of fraud or a violation of the law
which could overcome the evidentiary presumption that the landlord's
motives were proper.40 A lack of good faith is not necessarily shown
if there has been an honest miscalculation as to one's rights or duties,
but rather some interested or sinister motive must be demonstrated.41
Thus, in those cases where the landlord has made some attempt to
repair the defect, the tenant is obligated to present substantial evi-
dence tending to show a lack of good faith. Due to this added eviden-
tiary burden on the tenant, landlords may easily avoid the impact
of the warranty by making token repairs in a feigned display of "good
faith."
The entrenchment of the "no-good-faith-effort-to-repair" criterion
began in Jackson v. Rivera42 which was decided the same day as
Amanuensis. The court in Jackson allowed a tenant to defend against
the landlord's nonpayment action on the grounds that the landlord
had breached the implied warranty of habitability, thus entitling the
tenant to a rent setoff for funds spent on repairing a defective toilet.43
However, the court found that this landlord had not made a good
faith effort to comply with the housing codes because he had refused
to repair the toilet.44 In the next New York case that ruled on the
warranty, Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine,45 the court ruled that
the tenant was required to pay only 80 percent of his rent, the other
20 percent constituting damages for the landlord's breach of the war-
ranty4 6 Again, in Rosenshine the court allowed the setoff on the
39. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); Kline v.
Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971). An examination of these cases will not
reveal a criteria similar to the "no-good-faith-effect-effort" prerequisite found in
Amanuensis.
40. 21 N.Y. JuR. Evidence § 116 (1961).
41. Edwards-Warren Tire Co. v. Coble, 102 Ga. App. 106, 115 S.E.2d 852, 858
(1960); see 21 N.Y. JUR. Evidence § 201 (1961).
42. 65 Misc. 2d 468, 318 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971).
43. Id, at 470-71, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 10-11.
44. Id. at 471, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
45. 67 Misc. 2d 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971).
46. Id. at 327-28, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 366-67.
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ground of the warranty, with the finding that the landlord had not
made a bona fide effort to repair.47
Despite the apparent trend toward the inclusion of this burden-
some prerequisite into the law, more recent warranty cases in New
York City's civil court indicate that tenants will no longer have to
present evidence tending to show a lack of good faith on the part of
the landlord. In Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 48 the court awarded
one half of approximately three-years' rent to the tenants as damages
for the landlord's breach of the warranty of habitability, even though
the court found that there "was an effort by the landlord to respond
constructively that was grossly inadequate but by no means trivial.'1 4 9
Clearly, this landlord at least made an effort to repair. However,
whether this was sufficient to be considered a "good faith effort" is
a question which the court did not discuss except as a mitigating
factor in determining the damages.50 Since the court's opinion did
not mention the repair prerequisite and since no evidence was pre-
sented to indicate a lack of good faith, it seems as though the Velez
court abandoned the "no-good-faith-effort-to-repair" criterion. This con-
clusion is further supported by Steinberg v. Carreras,51 where the
landlord's breach consisted of a failure to provide heat for 28 days and
hot water for 12 days52 due to a number of boiler breakdowns which
occurred over the course of a winter. The landlord in Steinberg did
make good faith efforts to repair since the breakdowns were attended
47. Id. at 326, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 365. Rosenshine's employment of the first Amanu-
ensis criterion was reflected in Mannie Joseph, Inc. v. Stewart, 71 Misc. 2d 160, 335
N.Y.S.2d 709 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1972), in which the court totally abated the tenant's
rent in sustaining a warranty of habitability defense to the landlord's nonpayment ac-
tion. The judge personally viewed the unit and dubbed it "a chamber of horrors," id.
at 161, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 710, indicating that the landlord also had not made a good faith
effort to repair.
48. 73 Misc. 2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973).
49. Id. at 1001, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
50. Id.
51. 74 Misc. 2d 32, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973), rev'd per curiam,
77 Misc. 2d 774, 357 N.Y.S.2d 369 (App. T. 1974). This case was reversed on the
ground that "there was a lack of adequate proof of the reduced value of the apart-
ments as a result of the landlord's failure to supply heat ....." Id. at 775, 357 N.Y.S.2d
at 370. Since the case was reversed on the above stated narrow grounds, it is upheld
as a matter of law on the issues which affect the warranty of habitability.
52. 74 Misc. 2d at 34, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 141. Steinberg did not apply the war-
ranty of habitability directly, but it did utilize a basic warranty principle. See notes
55-61 infra & accompanying text. However, the court indicated its willingness to apply
the doctrine under the facts of the case, 74 Misc. 2d at 38, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
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to within five or six days, 53 yet the court awarded the tenants a rent
setoff for the landlord's failure to provide those services.5 4 Thus, Velez
and Steinberg indicate that New York City's tenants will no longer
have to assume the extra evidentiary burden involved in proving that
the landlord did not make a bona fide effort to repair.
IMPACT OF THE WARRANTY ON
NEW YORK LAW
When New York's appellate courts are called upon to rule on
the warranty, they will be confronted with a number of legal issues
which have already arisen in the previously discussed lower court
cases. Steinberg illustrates the possible import of the warranty doctrine
on New York State's landlord-tenant law. Unlike other cases which
were explicitly grounded on the warranty,55 the court in Steinberg
applied the doctrine indirectly. Steinberg held that the landlord's
failure to provide heat for 28 days and hot water for 12 days contra-
vened an express provision of the lease with the tenants, thereby en-
titling them to a setoff equal to one week's rent.5  The court then
noted that "[t]he result reached . . . on the basis of the lease provi-
sions would be independently required under the developing doctrine
of implied warranty of habitability, at least with regard to the period
not connected with the repair of the boiler."5 7 While this discussion
53. 74 Misc. 2d at 33-34, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
54. Id. at 38, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
55. E.g., Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 325, 323
N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971); Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15,
318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971).
56. 74 Misc. 2d at 38, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
57. Id. at 38, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 145 (emphasis added). In mentioning the lack of
service during repairs of the boiler, the court raised, but never squarely confronted, the
issue of whether the warranty of habitability would make actionable interruptions of
service which are temporary and beyond the control of the landlord. The landlord
claimed that for two days the boiler was being repaired due to a sidewalk cave-in. Id.
at 33, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
In an article written before the warranty doctrine was adopted by many jurisdic-
tions, one author advocated limiting the warranty in those cases where the landlord's
failure to provide services was due to circumstances beyond his control, Skillern, supra
note 16, at 395. This would be analogous to defending against a claim of a breach of
contract on the grounds of impossibility of performance. See generally Canadian Indus.
Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 258 N.Y. 194, 179 N.E. 383 (1932); Angus v.
Scully, 176 Mass. 357, 57 N.E. 674 (1900).
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of the warranty was merely dicta, it is important to note that the deci-
sion could not have been reached without the incorporation of some of
the warranty principles. The landlord initiated this case by asking
for a summary nonpayment eviction against 36 tenants. 8 Clearly, these
tenants would have been dispossessed under the traditional property
concepts even if they had won their breach of lease counterclaim. 0
However, in deciding against the landlord's action for possession and
upholding the tenants' partial defense by awarding the setoff, the
court adopted the principle that the obligation on the part of the
tenant to pay rent and the landlord's performance of his obligations
to maintain the premises were mutually dependent upon one an-
other.6 0 The effect of the Steinberg decision was to interject the
"dependency of promises" doctrine, which was implicit in the war-
ranty by virtue of its contractual nature, into the landlord-tenant law
generally. This interjection radically alters existing law. At least one
jurisdiction which has adopted the warranty doctrine limits the use
of the mutuality of promises doctrine to those cases in which a tenant
alleges and proves a breach of the warranty.61 Thus, the broad impact
attributed to the warranty in Steinberg will undoubtedly be an issue
which the appellate courts must eventually resolve.
The impact of the "dependency of promises" doctrine does not
stop with the issues raised by the Steinberg case. Even if New York's
appellate courts were to limit the effect of the mutuality doctrine
only to warranty cases, the warranty doctrine still would be in con-
flict with the state's special or summary nonpayment proceeding
statutes.62 The summary proceeding is a device which enables a land-
58. 74 Misc. 2d at 32, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 139 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973).
59. See notes 6-8 supra & accompanying text.
60. See notes 19-23 supra & accompanying text. This conclusion is supported by
a direct statement of the court. In its discussion of a lease provision which limited the
tenant's possible defenses in a summary proceeding only to the issue of payment, the
court stated that "the principle sustaining such lease provisions was adopted at a time
when the intimate inter-relationship between the landlord's right to receive rent and
his duty to provide services had not received judicial recognition ... " 74 Misc. 2d at
37, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
61. See Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Moskovitz, Rent
Withholding and the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE Rv. 49, 66
(1970).
62. See generally N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS LAw §§ 713, 721, 735, 747 (McKin-
ney 1963), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1973). While it is possible for the war-
ranty and the summary proceeding to coexist within the law (see note 61 supra &
accompanying text), it is contended that these two rules of law are inimical in spirit
and principle. New York's courts have been willing to circumvent the summary pro-
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lord to collect his rents without the expense of protracted litigation by
limiting the tenant's defenses to the issue of payment.68 This procedure
was a sensible one when, regardless of the landlord's alleged breaches,
the tenant could only maintain possession if he continued to pay his
rent. 4 However, since the warranty provides that the tenant's obliga-
tion to pay rent is dependent upon the landlord's promise to maintain
the premises in habitable condition, the summary proceeding becomes
an obsolete and logically inconsistent provision within the law. In
addition, the summary proceeding has been severely criticized. While
it was ostensibly created to protect the landlord from the expense of
protracted lawsuits, the economic hardship sustained by a tenant, whp
is forced to bring a separate action in order to collect damages for
the landlord's breaches, is often greater than that which would be suf-
fered by the landlord were the summary procedure not available. 5
Furthermore, some courts have noted that the landlord's interests
are adequately protected if the tenant is required to deposit his rents
with the court before the commencement of the trial. In the event
the landlord is successful in his nonpayment action, the money will
be available to satisfy his judgment.66 In light of these arguments
and other attacks against the summary proceeding, 67 it is contended
that the propriety of the nonpayment procedure is very much in doubt.
The warranty has also had an impact upon one of New York's
various remedial statutes.68 Specifically, section 755 of New York's
ceeding when confronted by authority which is in conflict with it. In reviewing the
history of the summary eviction or nonpayment proceeding, the court in Markese v.
Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, (Monroe County Ct. 1972), concluded
that because the procedure is "in derogation" of the common law, it must be strictly
construed against the landlord when it conflicts with a statute which enables the tenant
to bring "any legal or equitable defense." Id. at 480, 486, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 66, 72.
The statute referred to in Markese is N. Y. REvA. PROP. ACTIONS LAW § 743 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1973), amending (McKinney 1963).
63. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 72-73 (1972).
64. See note 7-9 supra & accompanying text.
65. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 84-85 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting
in part); 58 VA. L. REv. 930, 943 (1972).
66. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 n.67 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
67. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-79 (1972) (in which a summary
proceeding provision was unsuccessfully challenged on Constitutional grounds); 25
VAND. L. REV. 654, 658 (1972). See generally Clough, The Case Against the Doctrine
of Independent Covenants, 52 OREGON L. REv. 39 (1972); Note, The Constitutionality
of Texas' Landlord Laws and Other Summary Proceeding, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 215
(1973); Comment, Landlord Tenant Law, 25 U. FLA. L. Rav. 220 (1972).
68. See note 12 supra & accompanying text.
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Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law 9 is intended to force
landlords to repair properties which are not in substantial compliance
with the housing codes. This is supposed to be accomplished by allow-
ing the tenant, upon an order of the court, to deposit his rent with the
court clerk until the landlord makes the repairs. Although this statute
and other remedial statutes have been criticized for their ineffective-
ness, 70 landlords will nevertheless argue that the withholding pro-
visions of section 755 are designed to provide an exclusive remedy
for tenants and that the enactment of section 755 is an implicit re-
jection of the warranty doctrine.
In spite of an earlier decision which held that this statute,
as a merely remedial device, does not provide the tenant with "any
new substantive rights,"' 71 an examination of the thrust of the war-
ranty cases in New York tends to cast doubt on section 755's pre-
emptive force. The court in Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine,72-
in addition to issuing a withholding order, awarded the tenants a
20 percent setoff as damages for the landlord's breach of the warranty,
thus requiring the tenant to deposit only 80 percent of his rent into
the court. Section 755 permits rent withholding, but does not provide
any mechanism for reducing the rent to be deposited.3 One commen-
tator thus remarked that Rosenshine "probably goes further than most
courts in New York would be willing to go absent legislation."' 7" None-
theless, the judicial extension of the provisions in section 755 con-
tinued in Ellabee Realty Corp. v. Beach,75 in which a landlord in-
itiated an action to obtain all the funds which his tenants had de-
posited with the court pursuant to an earlier withholding order. The
69. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS LAW § 755 (McKinney Supp. 1973). [hereinafter
referred to as section 755]. The requirement for the issuance of a section 755 order is
a showing by the tenant that the condition of the premises is "likely to become dan-
gerous to life, health and safety." Id. Subdivision three of section 755 was a recent
amendment that allowed the funds which are deposited in court to be released to the
landlord only for the purpose of repair, thus not entirely encumbering the landlord's
capital and resulting in counterproduce effect. Chapter 820 of the 1969 Laws extended
the statute's force throughout the State of New York. As originally adopted the statute
was only applicable inside New York City.
70. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 3, at 242-49.
71. 176 East 123rd St. Corp. v. Flores, 65 Misc. 2d 130, 317 N.Y.S.2d 150
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1970).
72. 67 Misc. 2d 325, 327-28, 323 N.Y.S.2d 363, 367 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971).
73. See REAL PROP. ACTIONs LAW § 755 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
74. Diamond, 1971 Survey of New York Law: Property Law, 23 SYRACUSe L.
REv. 569, 603 (1972).
75. 72 Misc. 2d 658, 340 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1972).
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court noted that the landlord had not repaired any of the defects
that led to the issuance of the section 755 order during the two years
that the order had been in effect. Under these circumstances, the
court awarded all the deposited rents to the tenant in order to avoid
frustrating the purpose of the statute.7 6 The same reasoning was em-
ployed in Velez, where the court stated that:
The purpose of a 755 order, to motivate the Landlord to
discharge his responsibilities, would be brutally undercut, if he
could calmly await the removal of the tenant because of in-
tolerable conditions and then pick up the money.
77
The above discussion demonstrates that when the statute is em-
ployed in conjunction with the warranty doctrine, the tenant is pro-
vided with a comprehensive remedy. However, in the absence of
warranty principles, section 755 neither compels the landlord to repair
nor provides compensation to the tenant since he is forced to continue
to live in deplorable surroundings and still surrender his rent.78 This
author would argue that the courts have refused to rule that section
755 preempts the warranty doctrine because, without the presence of
the warranty, the statute fails to fulfill its designated purpose.
ECONOMIC IMPACT
While the warranty doctrine may be a desirable remedy for some
of the inequities of the present landlord-tenant law, there are sub-
stantial economic difficulties that this new doctrine may present for the
residential-rental market.7 9 Economic ramifications may result because
the warranty doctrine strikes at the heart of the landlord's financial
base-his rents. In addition, since New York and most jurisdictions
which have adopted the warranty doctrine utilize the housing codes
as guidelines for minimum standards of habitability,8 0 extensive use
76. Id. at 659-60, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 9-10.
77. 73 Misc. 2d at 1001, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
78. Ellabee Realty Corp. v. Beach, 72 Misc. 2d 658, 660, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 10;
Quinn & Phillips, supra note 3, at 246.
79. Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor, 80 YALE
L.J. 1093, 1095 (1971).
80. Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 999-1000, 343 N.Y.S.2d
406, 410 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973). Most jurisdictions that have adopted the warranty
doctrine utilize the codes as the standards. E.g., Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill.
2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr.
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of the doctrine would be equivalent to private enforcement of the
codes, converting each violation into its money value.s The con-
sequences of comprehensive code enforcement through the warranty
are particularly acute in the lower-income rental market,8 2 as illus-
trated by the following statement from a recent New Jersey case:
We take judicial notice of the fact that there is an acute
shortage of low-income housing in the City of Newark, and
that such housing which exists is frequently not in full com-
pliance with the city's housing ordinances and building codes.
We must also recognize the hard practical facts of life that if
landlords under existing conditions, were to be deprived of all
rents because of noncompliance with such ordinances and building
codes there would be far fewer available low income housing units
because landlords would either abandon their properties, or if they
spent the money needed to comply with the ordinances and codes
the amount of rent they would have to charge would price low in-
come tenants out of the market. The problems seem to be almost in-
solvable.83
The court's statement is supported by statistics showing that a sig-
nificant nimber of units are being abandoned by landlords in the
slum areas of New York and other cities.8 4
661 (Ct. App. 1972); Samuelson v. Quinones, 119 N.J. Super. 338, 291 A.2d 580
(App. Div. 1972). As of 1968, over 4,900 municipalities had housing codes and many
states had set minimum standards. Comment, supra note 11. Contra, Mease v. Fox,
200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
Lemle and others do not rely on the codes but purport to judge each case "on its
facts" taking into account such factors as the "seriousness of the claimed defect and
the length of time for which it persists." For a more complete list of the relevant fac-
tors to be considered in those cases that do not rely on the codes for standards, see
Comment, supra note 5, at 659.
81. Bross, Law Reform Man Meets the Slumlord, 3 URBAN LAWYER 609, 617
(1971).
82. A low-income family of four is defined as one whose income is below $4,500
per year. Clough, supra note 67, at 40 n.5. Because this author feels that this figure
vastly understates what an adequate living income is, the term "lower-income" is used
in this Comment as including tenants whose income for a family of four is somewhat
higher than $4,500 per year.
83. Samuelson v. Quinones, 119 N.J. Super. 338, 343, 291 A.2d 580, 583 (App.
Div. 1972). For a definition of "code compliance," see Comment, Philadelphia's Urban
Homesteading Ordinance, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 735, 738 n.12 (1974). For a definition
and extensive discussion of the phenomenon of abandonment, see id. at 744-52.
84. As of 1970, New York City had 18,000 abandoned multiple dwellings and
the pace of this phenomenon has been accelerating over the past fourteen years, Com-
ment, supra note 83, at 745-46. Other cities have also experienced a proportional
abandonment crisis. For the statistics on this trend in Washington, D.C., Boston, Phila-
delphia, Baltimore, Detroit, Houston, Cleveland, and Buffalo, see id. at 746 n.62.
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While it is clear that the abandonment problem is due at least
in part to comprehensive code enforcement, very little research has
been done to determine the extent of code enforcement's effect upon
lower-income rental markets. Thus, the economic impact of the war-
ranty doctrine cannot be ascertained with any great degree of accuracy.
However, Professor James Bross conducted a study in a number of low-
income areas in Philadelphia 5 which does provide some dues. This
survey attempted to determine the effect upon slum markets of a
private code enforcement program which included: provisions pro-
hibiting any extra or nonjudicial eviction; rent withholding by de-
positing funds into an escrow account and allowance of a full refund
to the tenant if the landlord did not repair within six months; and
prohibitions against rent increases and retaliatory evictions during the
pendency of any withholding order.86 With the exception of the pro-
visions concerning retaliatory evictions,8 7 this program yields legal
consequences which are almost identical to the warranty's results.
Thus, the findings of this study should be roughly similar to those
which the warranty would produce. The study concluded that in
those areas where one-third of the housing was already abandoned
and another one-third was unfit (in that it was below code com-
pliance) the program forced many landlords to repair, but, an equal
number abandoned their properties. However, where 20-25 percent of
the housing in an area was unfit and only 10 percent or less was
abandoned, a significant minority of buildings (20 out of 119) were
repaired while the remainder continued to be maintained at their
previous level.88 Thus, the overall pattern" was one of significant im-
provement of approximately 17 percent of the structures involved
in the program, while the remaining 83 percent at least did not
worsen.89 However, abandonment was exacerbated by comprehensive
85. See Bross, supra note 81. (Professor Bross is an assistant professor of law at
the Northwestern School of Law.)
86. Id. at 619-20.
87. Despite the warranty's ability to compensate the tenant while allowing him to
remain in possession during the lease, the power of the landlord to refuse to renew the
lease or to cancel a periodic tenancy without having to account for his motives con-
tinues to be troublesome for the more foresighted tenant. See Edwards v. Habib, 397
F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), rev'g 277 A.2d 388 (Ct. App. D.C. 1967). See generally
Comment, Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 785, 789 (1971).
88. Bross, supra note 81, at 625, 627.
89. Id. at 625.
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code enforcement in the most depressed areas-a result predicted by
a number of municipal license and inspection officials. 0
In light of his findings, Professor Bross concluded that the reform
program would undoubtedly remove many unfit structures from the
market.91 However, this would occur in only the most dilapidated
areas where abandonment and its attendant consequences, 2 had
already taken their toll. In most areas, the majority of structures would
remain unrepaired, but those tenants still in possession would be pay-
ing little or no rent.0 3 Analogizing the results of this study to the war-
ranty situation and assuming that the doctrine would be extensively
utilized, it seems the warranty would reduce the housing stock in
lower-income markets by triggering some abandonment. Nonetheless,
the extent of this phenomenon would not be as drastic as some have
feared. In addition, it should be noted that a lower-income tenant, by
definition, cannot afford to pay as much rent as other tenants; thus
there is an absolute ceiling on the maximum quality of housing for
the poor. Ultimately, improvements beyond this ceiling are dependent
upon the infusion of governmental aid into this market. 4 While some
efforts have been made in this direction, 5 one commentator has noted
that the courts cannot and do not control "the other tools of social
policy which are needed for a coordinated attack on the housing
problem."0 6 However, the courts should not hesitate to take reasonably
effective and responsible initiatives, such as the adoption of the war-
ranty doctrine, even in the face of possible, but not drastic, economic
ramifications.
While most of the economic questions have centered on the pos-
sible counterproductive effects of the warranty on the financially
marginal slum markets, the economic impact on middle- and upper-
income residential markets must also be considered. Because these
units are not in as bad repair as the lower-income units,0 7 the effect
90. Nachbaur, Empty Houses, 17 How. L.J. 3, 40 (1971).
91. Bross, supra note 81, at 627.
92. Comment, supra note 83, at 751-52.
93. Bross, supra note 81, at 627.
94. Id. at 627-28.
95. Edson, Housing Abandonment, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRADE J. 382, 382-86
(1972).
96. 84 HARv. L. Rav. 729, 735 (1971).
97. Compare Steinberg v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 32-35, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136,
139-41 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973) with Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996,
998, 344 N.Y.S.2d 406, 409 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973).
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of the warranty of habitability will undoubtedly be less economically
threatening to the owners of upper- and middle-income housing stock.
In addition, the nature of these markets is very different from that of
the lower-income market. Because the vacancy rate is significantly
higher in upper- and middle-income markets,98 the competition among
landlords is greater. Landlords are more sensitive to their tenants'
maintenance demands; thus, they may be expected to avoid the force
of the warranty by making repairs and preventing a loss of rental
income. Because upper- and middle-income tenants have the advantage
of a lessee's market, the warranty doctrine will have a much greater
deterrent effect on the landlord in these areas than in the lower-income
areas.
RULE CHANGE VERSUS COLLECTIVISM
Having investigated the legal and economic ramifications of the
warranty doctrine, there remains another critical question: Will the
warranty be utilized by tenants to the degree necessary to produce the
results for which it is designed? Until recently, most legal scholars
and lawyers assumed that merely because a law had been decreed a
significant number of people would utilize it. However, legal sociolo-
gist Marc Galantere 9 and others who have studied the legal process
have contended that changes in the law which favor a specific group
will have little impact in accomplishing reform in favor of that group
unless its members organize to pursue their cause in a coherent and
coordinated fashion. 100 Litigants such as tenants, who are interested
in a "one-shot" lawsuit, cannot afford the best legal services and do
not use overall strategies designed to effect true reforms. In addition,
victory in one lawsuit is often symbolic for, as Professor Galanter
98. See UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1973, at 685, table 1159 (94th ed.), which shows statistics on the
number of units completed and rented in the calendar quarter of 1970 to 1972. The
lower-income units showed a significantly lower vacancy rate in all quarters with the
exception of one. The figures also show the vacancy rates for rental units from 1969
to 1972 broken down according to the rent per month. The units renting for $60 to
$99 per month had a vacancy rate of approximately 4.75 percent, while those renting
for $100 or more showed a 6.2 percent vacancy rate. Id. at 686, table 1162.
99. M. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead 30-32, 45-49, August, 1973
(unpublished article by Professor Marc Galanter, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence,
State University of New York at Buffalo, on file at Buffalo Law Review).
100. For a discussion of the difficulties involved in rule change, see id. at 30-32,
45-49.
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states: "Rule-changes secured from courts or other peak agencies do
not penetrate automatically and costlessly to other levels of the system,
as attested by the growing literature on impact." 101
Myron Moskovitz, Chief Attorney of the National Housing and
Economic Development Law Project in Berkeley, California, has
taken a position on the proposed Model Residential Landlord-Tenant
Code'0 2 which is similar to the approach of Professor Galanter. Mr.
Moskovitz, states that the basic problem for low-income tenants is their
lack of bargaining power due to the housing shortage.0 3 He concludes
that "[i]n the face of these stark economic realities, the nature of the
landlord-tenant laws on the books in [the tenant's] state is largely
irrelevant."' 0 4 In order to make significant reforms in the landlord-
tenant law, we must increase the supply of decent housing and "or-
ganize tenants to use collective action, so tenants will have more bar-
gaining power."' 0 5 Thus, Mr. Moskovitz's solution is essentially iden-
tical to the one put forth by Mr. Galanter: reorganization and collec-
tivization of the parties into one coherent contingent. 0 Assuming
that the warranty, in theory, is capable of producing favorable legal
consequences for tenants, and assuming that its economic impact would
not significantly disrupt the already tenuous slum markets, the issues
raised by Mr. Galanter and Mr. Moskovitz are essentially strategic
ones. First, is it worth pressing for the adoption of the warranty or
would such action merely drain resources that could be used to im-
plement more effective remedies? Second, would the warranty have
any effect in the battle to provide decent housing and adequate reme-
dies for tenants?
In order to investigate these questions, it is necessary to divide
rental markets into the two categories utilized previously in the section
on economic impact. As has already been noted, 0 7 the nature of the
lower-income market is vastly different from that of the upper- and
middle-income markets. Similarly, in terms of the "rule change versus
collectivism" issue, there will be a difference in the impact of the war-
ranty depending upon which market is being considered.
101. Id. at 47. See Bross, supra note 81, at 609 (statement by a legal service
attorney on the minimal results of court rulings).
102. MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE (Tent. Draft 1969).
* 103. Moskovitz, The Model Landlord-Tenant Code, 3 URBAN LAWYER 597
(1971).
104. Id. at 597-98.
105. Id. at 598.
106. M. Galanter, supra note 99, at 51.
107. See notes 97-98 supra & accompanying text.
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An examination of the upper- to middle-income markets reveals
two circumstances which will help insure the effectiveness of a rule
change such as the utilization of the warranty doctrine. First is the
obvious fact that these tenants can afford to obtain the services of ex-
perienced and effective lawyers. Thus, upper- to middle-income tenants
can be expected to resort to the remedies provided by the warranty
doctrine more frequently than lower-income tenants. 108 Second, the
warranty will have a greater deterrent effect in upper- to middle-
income markets due to their more competitive nature. 0 9 In essence,
upper- to middle-income tenants will not have to resort to the legal
rule as frequently as lower-income tenants because its mere presence
will tend to produce the desired reforms. Therefore, it is contended
that, despite the caveats against rule changes forwarded by' legal
sociologists, the warranty will be an effective device in upper- to
middle-income rental markets.
In contrast to the upper- and middle-income markets, the lower-
income market displays those characteristics which would tend to
decrease the effectiveness of a judicially imposed rule change. Not only
do slum landlords have the advantage of a tremendous disparity 'in
bargaining power over their tenants,"0 but also researchers have found
that lower-income tenants are less likely to challenge or complain
to their landlords."' In addition, since the housing shortage in lower-
income markets is severe"1 and the level of maintenance is often
low," 3 the magnitude of these problems would seem to indicate that a
legal rule change alone would not correct the inadequacies and de-
ficiencies under which lower-income tenants suffer. 1 4 However, the
warranty doctrine can play a significant role in the strategies of col-
lective action. In his article criticizing the rule change approach taken
by the Model Landlord-Tenant Code, Mr. Moskovitz specifically criti-
cized the lack of warranty-like provisions in the proposed Code." 5
108. It is not only the fiscal advantage that enables upper- to middle-income
tenants to litigate more frequently than lower-income tenants, but also, upper- to mid-
dle-income tenants are not subjected to the inhibiting and frustrating circumstance of
living in a state of poverty. Hill, Housing the Poor, 41 U. Couo. L. REv. 541, 544
(1969); Vaughan, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in a Low-Income Area, 16 SocIAL
PROBLEmS 208, 216 (1968).
109. See note 98 supra & accompanying text.
110. Moskovitz, supra note 103, at 597.
111. Hill, supra note 108; Vaughan, supra note 108.
112. Moskovitz, supra note 103, at 597.
113. See notes 82-84 supra & accompanying text.
114. See notes 95-96 supra & accompanying text.
115. Moskovitz, supra note 103, at 598-99.
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He recognized that while collective action holds greater promise
in terms of overall effectiveness, it too will fail unless there are legal
principles upon which organized tenants can rely to enforce their
demands.116 Because the warranty allows rent withholding where
landlords have failed to repair, because it prevents a landlord from
dispossessing a tenant when he does withhold, and because it directly
compensates tenants by awarding damages or rent abatements, the
doctrine can serve as a very valuable tool in the legal arsenal of col-
lectivized tenants. Thus, although the ultimate impact of the warranty
doctrine will depend upon the collective action of lower-income
tenants, its adoption by New York courts is justified as a step by
which the effectiveness of such collective actions can be increased.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing analyses of the legal, economic, and
utilitarian effects of the warranty of habitability in New York State,
an assessment of the warranty's overall impact can be suggested. One
concern has been the potential economic damage that would be caused
by the widespread usage of the warranty. However, the economic
analysis undertaken in this Comment indicates that the warranty's
impact will not be as drastic as has been feared. In addition, due to
the aforementioned inherent limitations on the effectiveness of a rule
change, it cannot automatically be assumed that the warranty would
enjoy the kind of universal application which would test its maximum
economic impact. Thus, it is not anticipated that the doctrine will pre-
cipitate major economic difficulties.
However, there remain a number of unanswered questions concern-
ing the warranty's economic impact. For example, the tenant's ability
to recover consequential or incidental damages is a subject that has
been raised in the literature.11 7 In addition, the question arises as to
whether the warranty will support an action for strict tort liability.
Some indication of the future judicial disposition of this issue is
evident in a recent New Jersey case in which the court ruled that the
warranty does not give rise to strict tort liability for a tenant's per-
116. In 1970, Mr. Moskovitz labeled then recent warranty of habitability deci-
sions as "some of the most important landlord-tenant cases ever to be decided by
American courts," Moskovitz, supra note 61, at 49.
117. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 3, at 256; Skillern, supra note 16, at 396;
Comment, supra note 5, at 671 n.124.
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sonal injuries."x 8 While it is difficult to predict the eventual disposi-
tion of such an issue in New York's courts, it is clear from the New
Jersey decision that economic factors alone may result in limitations
on the various ancillary causes of action that could theoretically arise
under the warranty doctrine. 19
Another approach which the courts may adopt in order to
tailor the warranty doctrine to the economic realities of the residential
rental market is to provide some flexibility with regard to the opera-
tion of a waiver. Although the warranty generally cannot be waived
by the tenant or contractually disclaimed by the landlord, 2 0 it has
been suggested that the "occasional" landlord (usually the lessor of
an apartment in his own home) be given the opportunity to avoid the
obligations imposed on his commercial counterpart.' 2 1 This policy
would be appropriate since the adoption of the warranty doctrine
has been justified in part on the assumption that the landlord is en-
gaged in the business of renting residential units and, therefore, has
expertise upon which the tenant relies. 22 As a model for such a waiver,
one might use those statutes which imply a covenant of "fitness for
intended purpose" into residential leases while providing that a tenant
may agree to undertake specific repairs, but only if the waiver is "sup-
ported by adequate consideration and set forth in a conspicuous
writing." 123
Due to the complexity of the housing situation and the economic
concerns surrounding the warranty, the courts may conceivably view
the implied warranty of habitability as a sui generis legal device. As
such, the warranty may be regarded as so unique that attempts to
predict even the general course that will be taken by the courts, for
example, by comparing it with other warranties in our law,124 would
be a fruitless exercise.12 5 Clearly, the legitimate public concern for the
landlord's financial well-being might call for decisions that would seem
118. Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973); 5
SETON HALL L. REv. 409 (1974).
119. 5 SETON HALL L. REv. 409, 427-28 (1974).
120. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080 n.49 (D.C. Cir.
1970); MINN STAT. § 504.18 (1) (Supp. 1973).
121. Cf. 2 RUT.-CAm. L.J. 120, 126 (1970).
122. See Javins v. First Nat'I Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075-77 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
123. MINN. STAT. § 504.18 (2) (Supp. 1974).
124. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-312, -318.
125. Comment, Tenant Remedies, 16 VILL. L. REV. .710, 724-25, 726-27 (1971);
see 84 HAIv. L. REV. 729, 732-34 (1971).
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anomalous in the context of the law surrounding warranties in general.
However, the essentially contractual nature of the warranty of ha-
bitability is designed to meet this concern, since it furnishes equit-
able treatment for both the landlord and the tenant by awarding a
rent setoff until the landlord repairs and restoring the full rent to him
once he does repair. 26 The use of contract and sales principles in the
employment of the warranty provides reasonably fair judicial
standards127 and enables the courts to apply "equitable principles" in
making their decisions..2 Thus, because of the inherent flexibility of
the, contract principles embodied in the doctrine, the courts are free
to tailor the warranty to the various exigencies of the contemporary
housing situation.
While this Comment has been largely concerned with the legal
and economic impact of the warranty, there is another aspect of the
doctrine's impact which deserves mention. The importance of this
aspect has been emphasized by many authors who have taken notice
of the profound human costs of being subjected to the brutalizing,
condition of our cities' slums.u 9 In this context, the value of a com-
pensatory device such as the warranty of habitability was forcefully
noted by Thomas M. Quinn and Earl Phillips. In describing this area
of the law before the widespread adoption of the warranty doctrine
these authors observed: "The law of landlord-tenant is the law to
most low income dwellers and it instructs them everyday on the value
society places on basic fairness and the social classes it prefers."' 10
Clearly the adoption of the warranty of habitability can alleviate some
of the hardships of slum victims by compensating them for the en-
vironmental miseries to which they are subjected, 13' while providing
a greater measure of protection for all consumers in the residential
rental market.
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